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ABSTRACT
Compatibility Investments in Duopoly With Demand Side Spillovers Under
Different Degrees of Cooperation
by Christian Wey∗
This paper examines the effects of different degrees of cooperation on firms incentives
to undertake interbrand compatibility investments ex post, which benefit the competitor
indirectly via an increase of its mass market demand. We find that cooperation in
compatibility investments while preserving competition on the product market gives
second-best welfare for all positive values of the spillover parameter. For large spillover
effects cartelization in compatibility investments and on the product market is welfare
improving compared to pure competitive behavior. Hence, the paper gives strong
efficiency reasons for forming horizontal organizations such as standardization
committees, which help to achieve joint-profit maximization in compatibility
investments. Furthermore, we examine the effects of an open standardization policy
which increases the level of the spillover parameter, and show that an asymmetric
outcome might dominate the symmetric solution under a regime, where firms
cooperatively determine investment levels and noncooperatively choose production
quantities.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Kompatibilitätsinvestitionen im Duopol in der Gegenwart von nachfrageseitigen
Spillover-Effekten und die Rolle von horizontaler Kooperation
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Wirkungen horizontaler Kooperation auf die Anreize der
Unternehmen, Kompatibilitätsinvestitionen zu tätigen, die die Wettbewerbsposition des
rivalisierenden Unternehmens auf dem Absatzmarkt verbessert. Es wird gezeigt, daß
Kooperation auf der Investitionsstufe in Verbindung mit Konkurrenz auf dem
Produktmarkt zu zweitbesten Wohlfahrtsergebnissen führt. Dieses Ergebnis gilt für alle
zulässigen Werte des Spillover-Parameters. Für den Fall relativ großer Spillover-Effekte
kann es sogar dazu kommen, daß eine vollständige Kartellierung der Unternehmen zu
einer höheren Wohlfahrt führt als ein vollständig nicht-kooperatives Verhalten der
Unternehmen. Damit betont der Beitrag die Effizienzgründe für horizontale
Kooperationsformen wie Standardisierungsverbände, deren primärer Zweck die
Erlangung von unternehmensübergreifender Kompatibilität ist. Des weiteren werden die
Wirkungen einer Politik offener Standards untersucht, die zu einer Erhöhung der
Spillover-Effekte führt. Schließlich wird gezeigt, daß eine asymmetrische Lösung die
symmetrische Lösung dominieren kann, wenn die Unternehmen ihre
Investitionsausgaben kooperativ und ihre Ausbringungsmengen nicht-kooperativ
bestimmen.
1 Introduction
Many markets have the property that the higher the degree of compatibility of the
product with complementary products, the more valuable it is to an individual
consumer. This is a common feature of software markets and networks including
e-mail or facsimile machines. The extent to which various products are compatible
with one another is one of the most important dimensions of market structure,
and market performance.
In this paper we consider those markets in which compatibility among comple-
mentary products is achieved ex post, i.e., after ¯rm-speci¯c standards have been
established. To achieve interbrand compatibility ex post, ¯rms have to under-
take investments to make their newly developed products compatible with other
¯rms' standard technologies. For example, in the computer industry software
developing ¯rms as Microsoft or Macintosh have to decide about the degree of
compatibility between their software application programs and the rival's ope-
rating system. In this particular case, both ¯rms have established a standard
technology -the operating system- and sell in addition complementary applica-
tion programs. Firm-speci¯c standards are in existence when ¯rms decide about
the degree of interbrand compatibility of their complementary products. The
purpose of this paper is to examine ¯rms' incentives to invest into interbrand
compatibility which gives rise to demand side spillover e®ects. The paper also in-
vestigates the e®ects of di®erent degrees of cooperation, varying from pure market
contact to full cartelization.
We think of examples like computer operating systems and application software,
internet browsers and webpage designer tools/online-services, or transportation
services and timetable schedules. In each of these cases, ¯rms supply two com-
plementary products: A mass market product and either a complementary niche
market product, as in the case of application software and webpage designer tools,
or a complementary service, like timetable schedules, as in the case of transpor-
tation services. While complementary products of one brand belong to the same
¯rm-speci¯c compatibility standard, complementary products of di®erent brands
are incompatible when ¯rms do not invest into interbrand compatibility. If, ho-
wever, a ¯rm invests into interbrand compatibility the competitor's mass market
demand increases, simply because consumers value compatibility.
To illustrate this point, consider the World Wide Web as a highly stylized ex-
ample. Firms like Microsoft and Netscape basically serve two di®erent markets.
On the mass market they sell webpage browsers and on their niche markets they
sell webpage designer tools or server software to commercial buyers who again
produce webpages and online services used by consumers equipped with brow-
sers. Clearly, demand for ¯rm i's mass market product (like Netscape's internet
browser) goes up when ¯rm j undertakes investments to make its niche market
product (like Microsoft's webpage designer tools) more compatible with ¯rm i's
mass market product.
Under these conditions compatibility investments by ¯rm j increase ¯rm i's mass
market demand, and hence, generate positive spillovers which bene¯t ¯rm i.1
Furthermore, we assume that each ¯rm is a monopolist on the niche market on
which it sells specialized components, like e.g., webpage designer tools.2
As an alternative, and again, highly stylized example of our model consider trans-
portation services, as e.g., the international airline industry. International airlines
are organized as hub-and-spoke networks. Consider two airlines, like e.g., Ame-
rican Airways (AA) and British Airways (BA). AA uses Chicago and BA uses
London as its hub, operates to domestic endpoints (like Kansas City (AA) and
1The issue of compatibility investments is also extremely important in the strongly inter-
related computer industry where operating systems represent the mass market products. To
guarantee compatibility is critical for the survival of an operating system. For example, Apple
had to make large investments to improve the compatibility of its new operating system Ma-
cOS 8 with other ¯rms' application software, as has been reported by Magazin fÄur Computer
Technik, September, 1997, pp. 70-1, where a list of remaining incompatibilities of MacOS 8 is
presented.
2This market structure might be the result of locked-in commercial buyers who have under-
gone speci¯c investments.
2
Munich (BA)) as well as a transatlantic route to the hub of the other airline. This
means, both airlines serve basically two markets: The domestic market, which
is called in our paper the niche market, and the transatlantic route, which is in
our terms the mass market. Adopting the hub-and-spoke network structure, as
analyzed by Brueckner & Spiller [1991] and Brueckner [1998], the net-
works of the two airlines do not overlap, except on the transatlantic route. This
means, that airlines are monopolists in domestic city-pair markets other than
the transatlantic interhub mass market, on which both ¯rms compete. There
are two e®ects when one airline adjusts its timetable of arrival and departure
with the other airline's times of arrival and departure at its domestic hub. First,
the domestic demand increases because consumers are connected much faster to
the other airline when they make oversee travels, and second, the other airline
bene¯ts indirectly via an increased demand for its transatlantic route.3
In the realm of our model we analyze the tradeo® which each ¯rm faces when it
makes investments to make its niche market product more compatible with the
rival's mass market product.4 On the one hand, each ¯rm internalizes directly
the bene¯ts on its niche market, and on the other hand, the positive spillover
e®ect for the rival ¯rm on its mass market makes it behave more aggressively
such that, other things equal, mass market pro¯ts decrease for the investing ¯rm.
When ¯rms decide about compatibility after mass market standard technologies
have already been established this decision is not an either-or decision problem
as in the case of ax ante standardization but rather a matter of degree.5 The
3There are at least two more positive demand side e®ects from making inter-airline timeta-
ble adjustments in the international airline industry: First, there is a positive feedback e®ect
between stronger competition on the transatlantic route and the domestic demand of the in-
vesting ¯rm, and second, there is another positive spillover e®ect for the rival on its domestic
niche market accruing from the market expansion e®ect in the home country of the investing
¯rm. However, incorporating these e®ects into our model would make our point for the need of
cooperation even stronger.
4With respect to airline services, it is quite obvious that adjusting timetables is costly, and
that perfect alignment is almost unfeasible because of congestition constraints on each hub.
5A quick look at the computer industry reveals that making a specialized software perfectly
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degree of compatibility depends on the amount of investments ¯rms are willing
to undertake to design their complementary products or services unilaterally more
compatible with the other ¯rm's mass market product.6 Therefore, in contrast
to the traditional literature on compatibility standardization as represented by
Farrell & Saloner [1985], [1986], Katz & Shapiro [1985], [1986],Matutes
& Regibeau [1988] and others, which has focused on the coordination problems
of making products either compatible or not compatible with rivals' products ex
ante, our model looks at the investment incentive problems ex post accruing from
positive demand side spillovers.7 We also discuss how the application of antitrust
law and the protection of intellectual property rights a®ect private incentives to
increase interbrand compatibility.
Our paper is also related to the work by Kristiansen & Thum [1996] and Far-
rell & Katz [1998] which examine how compatibility shapes product market
competition and ¯rms' incentives to invest into R&D. Kristiansen & Thum
[1996] study the patterns of R&D investments in compatible networks where ¯rms
sell mass market and niche market products. R&D investments increase the qua-
lity of the mass market product, and therefore, bene¯t both duopolists via their
niche markets. Underinvestments results from neglected positive network exter-
compatible with all operating systems is almost unfeasible. The many di®erent interfaces with
older versions, existing ones and those which might be introduced in the future is quite large.
6This paper restricts attention to those markets, as we may ¯nd them for application soft-
ware, webpage designer tools or timetable schedules, in which ¯rms can make their niche market
products unilaterally compatible ex post. If, however, technical information is perfectly protec-
ted by patents, then interbrand compatibility can only be achieved by bilateral coordination ex
ante.
7Assuming that consumers value compatibility because of positive network externalities
Katz & Shapiro [1985] examine ¯rms' incentives to coordinate sunk investments on a parti-
cular compatibility standard ex ante. Products remain perfectly incompatible if ¯rms do not
coordinate because compatibility is an either-or decision. Matutes & Regibeau [1988], Eco-
nomides [1989], [1991a], [1991b], and Einhorn [1992] use a model of di®erentiated consumers
where a subset of them has a preference for mixing-and-matching products of di®erent brands.
However, in those models perfect compatibility is achieved costlessly ex ante and is always
pro¯table for ¯rms, which are assumed to behave noncooperatively.
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nalities. Overinvestment might occur strategically to induce the competitor to
increase mass market products' quality. Since they assume that ¯rms' products
are perfectly compatible they do not examine the e®ects of investments which
increase interbrand compatibility. Farrell & Katz [1998] analyze the critical
role of consumers' expectations concerning each ¯rm's market size and product
quality in a model with network externalities, where ¯rms compete in Bertrand
fashion. In both models only one supplier of the mass market product prevails in
equilibrium while our model examines how duopolistic competition on the mass
market a®ects ¯rms' incentives to invest into compatibility. Finally, both pa-
pers do not analyze how antitrust policy towards horizontal cooperation a®ects
product market competition and equilibrium compatibility levels.
Our analysis builds on the pioneering approach adopted by d'Aspremont &
Jacquemin [1988] to analyze ¯rms' R&D investment incentives in a two-stage
game. In their model ¯rms choose R&D levels at the ¯rst stage and compete on
the product market in Cournot fashion at the second stage.8 Firms are perfectly
symmetric, products are homogeneous, and R&D investment leads to a reduction
in unit costs governed by a quadratic cost function. R&D investments are charac-
terized by positive spillover e®ects measured by the spillover parameter ¯, with
0 · ¯ · 1. In the presence of positive spillover e®ects ¯rm i's R&D investments
do not only reduce ¯rm i's marginal costs, but also ¯rm j's marginal costs by
the fraction ¯. Given those conditions d'Aspremont and Jacquemin show that
for large spillovers such as ¯ > 0:5 cooperation in the R&D stage of the game
leads to higher investment levels compared to a competitive regime in which each
¯rm chooses its R&D expenditures noncooperatively. On the other hand, for
relatively low spillovers cooperation at the R&D stage leads to lower investments
8See Henriques [1990] for a critique and d'Aspremont & Jacquemin [1990] for a reply.
Their analysis has been extended and generalized by De Bondt & Veugelers [1991], De
Bondt, Slaets & Cassiman [1992], Kamien, Muller & Zang [1992], Suzumura [1992],
Vonortas [1994], Steurs [1995], Brod & Shivakumar [1997], Leahy & Neary [1997], Qiu
[1997], and Petit & Tolwinski [1999]. For a review of this literature see De Bondt [1996].
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than competitive R&D. Therefore, the authors conclude that contractual arran-
gements which induce joint pro¯t maximization at the R&D stage, while keeping
¯rms behaving competitively on the product market, can be e±ciency enhan-
cing when R&D spillovers are relatively large.9 This e±ciency rationale might
help explain why antitrust authorities are much less concerned about the anti-
competitive e®ects of cooperative research compared to other forms of horizontal
cooperation.10
Building on the two-stage framework of duopolistic competition as developed
by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin our analysis examines the impact of di®erent
degrees of cooperation on ¯rms' compatibility investment levels. At the ¯rst
stage, ¯rms decide on their compatibility investment level either cooperatively or
noncooperatively, and at the second stage they determine quantity levels of the
mass market product, again, either competitively or collusively. This gives the
following three di®erent regimes of interest:11
1. Compatibility Competition (NN ): Both ¯rms behave noncooperatively at
both stages of the game. At the second stage ¯rm i's mass market demand
is increased to some spillover from the rival's compatibility investments.
2. Compatibility Committee (CN ): At the ¯rst stage, both ¯rms coordinate
their investment activities so as to maximize the sum of overall pro¯ts. At
the second stage ¯rms compete where each ¯rm's mass market demand is
increased to some spillover from the other ¯rm's compatibility investments.
9See also Katz [1986] for an earlier paper which emphasizes the stimulation of incentives
towards investments in R&D e®orts due to cooperative agreements.
10An early e±ciency rationale of horizontal cooperation has been presented by Williamson
[1968]. See Grossman & Shapiro [1986], Jorde & Teece [1990], Brodley [1990] and
Shapiro & Willig [1990] for a critical assessment of the antitrust treatment of horizontal
cooperation in research and innovation.
11In the following, the regimes are abbreviated by two calligraphic letters, where the ¯rst
letter describes ¯rms' ¯rst-stage behavior either as noncooperative, what is indicated by N , or
as cooperative, what is indicated by C. The same method applies for the second letter which
stands for ¯rms' behavior at the second stage of the game.
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3. Cartelization (CC): Both ¯rms form a cartel and maximize at both stages
of the game joint pro¯ts.
In reality decisions concerning compatibility often take place within standardiza-
tion committees.12 In our model those committees are interpreted as organizati-
ons which induce joint pro¯t maximization with respect to ¯rms' compatibility
investments. This seems to be appropriate since committees de¯ne explicit pro-
cedures to coordinate on compatibility standardization. Under the compatibility
committee (CN ) regime we assume that cooperative relations between ¯rms do
not lead ¯rms to collude on the output market. In this case relations among ¯rms
are a hybrid of cooperation and competition.13 Under the cartelization (CC) re-
gime it is supposed that standardization committees are a means to collude on
the output market, and hence, lead to an overall cartelization of ¯rms.
Yet, despite the intuitive plausibility of demand side spillovers and the need for
¯rms to undertake investments to achieve interbrand compatibility, those invest-
ment activities have not been incorporated explicitly into the theoretical litera-
ture dealing with research joint ventures and with cooperative standard setting
groups.14 It is also interesting to note that the economic literature on standardi-
zation committees is surprisingly small. The only contributions we are aware are
Farrell & Saloner [1988] and Goerke & Holler [1995]. The ¯rst paper
compares committees and markets as alternative mechanisms to overcome coor-
dination failure when ¯rms choose between incompatible standards ex ante. The
12The importance of inter-¯rm cooperation on the standardization stage in software markets
has been emphasized by Katz & Shapiro [1998].
13For instance the W3 consortium is a standardization committee for achieving interbrand
compatibility between web browsers and web designer tools. In this particular case, Microsoft
and Netscape compete on the browser market and coordinate their activities towards interbrand
compatibility in the consortium (see Magazin fÄur Computer Technik, September, 1997, pp. 80-1,
for a description of this case).
14The literature on research joint ventures (see Footnote 8) does only consider knowledge
spillovers between ¯rms. Investment activities which generate positive demand side e®ects are
not examined in this strand of literature.
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second paper regards standardization committees as a mechanism of collective
decision making which maps buyers' preferences into standardization outcomes
via voting rules. In contrast to those papers, we interpret a standardization com-
mittee not only as a coordination device but also as a device to internalize positive
spillovers among ¯rms, which accrue from compatibility investments. Moreover,
while those papers target the issue of ex ante standardization our paper investiga-
tes ¯rms' incentives to establish compatibility ex post, after standard technologies
have come into existence.15
The main point of our paper is that organizations like standardization commit-
tees, or codesharing arrangements in the context of international airline services,
do in general help to internalize those spillovers and do lead to second-best wel-
fare levels as long as they do not induce ¯rms to collude on the output market.
Surprisingly, for high values of the spillover parameter welfare is even higher
under a regime where ¯rms cooperate in both stages compared to pure compe-
titive behavior in both stages. Therefore, our paper might help to explain why
horizontal cooperation in standardization committees or international airline al-
liances are usually not alleged to be anticompetitive, as long as it is limited to
standardization issues.16
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model,
solve for the subgame perfect equilibria for all three regimes, and calculate the
15Applying our paper to the international airline industry, we may interpret codesharing ar-
rangements within an international airline alliance analogously to standardization committees.
Those arrangements ticket a trip that involves travelling across the networks of both airlines as
if the travel occurred on a single carrier. As reported by Brueckner [1998] the main feature
of those codesharing arrangements is to achieve schedule coordination and to improve airport
gate proximity, so that connections between carriers become more convenient. Hence, if one
airline makes timetable adjustments, so that domestic passengers will ¯nd it easier to connect
to the other airline, an additional domestic passenger creates extra revenues for the domestic
¯rm on the home market and bene¯ts the other ¯rm on its transatlantic route, since a fraction
of additional passengers will travel via the other airline's transatlantic route.
16For instance, Katz & Shapiro [1998] state with respect to the software industry that they
\know of no successful antitrust challenges to cooperation to set software standards."
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welfare maximizing ¯rst-best outcome. In Section 3 we compare our results and
summarize the policy conclusions. In Section 4 and 5 we extend our model in
two directions. First, we analyze the impact of institutions which increase the
spillover e®ects generated by compatibility investments, and second, we show that
an asymmetric solution might dominate the symmetric outcome. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
We posit two ¯rms each producing a mass market product and a complementary
niche market product. For each ¯rm we assume that its mass market product
and its niche market product is designed according to the same ¯rm-speci¯c
interface technology, so that both products are perfectly compatible right from
the start. Without any investments into interbrand compatibility ¯rms' products
are homogeneous and ¯rms face a linear inverse demand function on the mass
market: pi(qi; qj) = A¡Q, with i = 1; 2, j 6= i, A > Q ¸ 0, and Q = qi+qj, where
pi stands for ¯rm i's mass market product price and qi denotes ¯rm i's production
quantity.17 Firms have the same constant marginal costs denoted by c, which are
normalized to zero. We assume that entry into the industry is unpro¯table and
that A > 0 holds, so that production is pro¯table for the incumbents.18
Let us now in detail describe the nature and the e®ects of compatibility invest-
ments. We focus on investments into interbrand compatibility which make a ¯rm's
niche market product more compatible with the other ¯rm's mass market product.
In our model those investments undertaken by ¯rm i, which are denoted by xi ¸ 0,
17In accordance with Martin [1993] we may interpret A as a measure of market size, derived
from the linear inverse demand schedule pi(qi; qj) = a ¡ bQ, with a; b > 0 and Q · a=b. The
parameter A is then de¯ned by a¡c
b
, and it measures the quantity that would be demanded if
price where equal to marginal cost.
18For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from any cross-market price e®ects between the niche
and the mass markets.
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have two e®ects: First, they increase buyers' maximum willingness to pay for
¯rm i's niche market product, and hence, bene¯t the investing ¯rm directly via
its niche market. In particular, we denote by xi ¯rm i's compatibility investment
level which increases ¯rm i's niche market net revenues linearly according to vxi,
with i = 1; 2, and v ¸ 0, denoting the constant marginal increase of niche market
net revenues. This means, buyers of ¯rm i's niche market product have a uniform
reservation price which increases linearly with ¯rm i's interbrand compatibility
investment level.19 The monopolistic supplier appropriates the entire consumer
surplus and realizes constant marginal net revenues, v, on the niche market from
additional investments.20 In order to deal with symmetric ¯rms, we assume that
v is the same for both ¯rms.
Second, ¯rm i's compatibility investment increases ¯rm j's mass market demand
19The linear speci¯cation of the reduced niche market pro¯ts does also apply to an ordinary
monopolistic market structure with linear demand. We derive the de¯ning equation for ¯rm i's
net revenue function, vxi, by calculating the ¯rst derivative of ¯rm i's reduced niche market
pro¯t function, ¦^i(p^i; xi) = y^i(p^i; xi)(p^i(xi) ¡ k), with respect to xi, where ¦^i(p^i; xi) denotes
¯rm i's pro¯ts as a function of xi evaluated at the monopoly price, p^i, y^i(p^; xi) stands for ¯rm
i's niche market demand, again, evaluated at the monopoly price, and k > 0 denotes the costs
per unit of the niche market product. Suppressing the subscript i, we get @ ¼^@ x =
@ y^
@ x (p^¡k)+ y^ d p^d x ,
where the right-hand side is represented in our model by the expression vx. In the special case
of a linear niche market demand function, y = M +x¡hp, we obtain @ ¼^
@ x
= 1
2h
(M +x¡hk), so
that v is equal to the constant term 12h , and reduced pro¯ts are a linear function of x. However,
for non-linear demand functions the impact of compatibility investments on producer surplus
is usually not linear.
20In our model speci¯cation, we measure the investment variable xi by the output generated
by ¯rm i's compatibility investments. It is not an input variable such as the amount of research
e®ort. It should be critically noted that d'Aspremont & Jacquemin [1988] as well measure
the amount of R&D investment by its output, such that an increase in x reduces marginal costs
by the same amount. That is, an increase in what d'Aspremont and Jacquemin call investment
is strictly speaking the reduction in marginal costs induced by the R&D e®ort. However, they
state that their investment variable measures the \amount of research" a ¯rm undertakes.
In contrast to their and our model, Kamien, Muller & Zang [1992] have de¯ned their
investment variable as an input variable. For a comprehensive comparison of both formulations
of the R&D spillover e®ect see Amir [1998].
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because consumers enjoy a broader range of complementary products and services
in a more convenient, i.e., in a more compatible way. This e®ect bene¯ts the rival
¯rm j indirectly via an increase of its mass market demand. Since ¯rm i's niche
market product is complementary to ¯rm j's mass market product, compatibility
investments of ¯rm i by the amount of xi lead to positive spillovers, such that ¯rm
j's mass market demand is shifted outward by the amount of ¯xi, where ¯ ¸ 0
stands for the spillover parameter. In contrast to informational R&D spillovers,
compatibility investment spillovers are bounded from above by the increase in
consumers' maximum willingness to pay for a marginal increase in compatibility
with the other ¯rm's niche market product.
Integrating the spillover e®ect into each ¯rm's inverse demand schedule gives
pi(qi; qj; xj) = A+ ¯xj ¡Q; j 6= i; i = 1; 2: (1)
This means, compatibility investments by ¯rm i di®erentiate the ¯rms' products
in the sense that they improve the quality of ¯rm j's mass market product relative
to ¯rm i's mass market product. An improvement in interbrand compatibility
undertaken by ¯rm i, therefore, increases consumers' willingness to pay for ¯rm
j's mass market product. Note, when compatibility investments are the same,
x1 = x2, both goods are perfect substitutes and have the same price on the
mass market; i.e. pi = A + ¯xj ¡ qi ¡ qj, with j 6= i. If, however, compatibility
investment levels are not the same, with xj > xi, then the goods are vertically
di®erentiated. This implies, every consumer is willing to pay a quality premium
for good i. For the individual inverse demand functions as speci¯ed by Equation
(1), the quality premium depends only on the di®erence in investment levels, such
that market clearing requires pi ¡ pj = xj ¡ xi.
Note also, that ¯rm i's individual mass market demand schedule (1) is indepen-
dent of its own compatibility investments. Those investments by ¯rm i do only
create positive spillover e®ects for the rival's mass market demand.
Moreover, we assume that ¯rm i's compatibility cost function, Ki, is a convex
function of the compatibility investment, xi, and given by Ki(xi) =
°
2
x2i , with
11
i = 1; 2 and ° > 0.21
Now, let us turn to the description of the two-stage game. In the ¯rst stage
all ¯rms simultaneously choose their compatibility investment levels and in the
second stage all ¯rms determine their output on the mass market. We consider
three regimes with varying degrees of cooperation between ¯rms. Under the
compatibility competition regime (NN ) ¯rms behave noncooperatively in both
stages of the game. Under the compatibility committee regime (CN ) both ¯rms
coordinate their compatibility investments in a standardization committee, but
behave noncooperatively in the mass market. Under the cartelization regime (CC)
¯rms cooperate in both stages of the game, so that relations in the standardization
committee lead to collusion on the mass market.
In order to compare the outcomes under the di®erent regime, we want to introduce
the following assumptions, which are in e®ect throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 The marginal pro¯ts on the niche market are su±ciently high:
v > 2¯A
9
.
Assumption 1 ensures that each ¯rm's marginal pro¯ts on the niche market, i.e.,
@ (xiv)
@ xi
= v, with i = 1; 2, give su±cient incentives to undertake compatibility in-
vestments when ¯rms behave noncooperatively in both stages of the game (NN
regime). Therefore, given that Assumption 1 holds, both ¯rms spend in all re-
gimes under consideration a strictly positive amount of money on compatibility
investments in each symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium.
Assumption 2 Compatibility costs are su±ciently convex: (i) ¯ <
p
2° ¼
1:41
p
° and (ii)
p
2° · 9v
2A
.
21Analogously to the concavity restrictions imposed on the R&D production function in the
model of Kamien, Muller & Zang [1992], the strict convexity of K implies limx!1 K 0 = 1,
which serves to guarantee existence of equilibria in which compatibility investments are bounded
from above.
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Assumption 2 (i) ensures that reduced pro¯t functions for all regimes in the ¯rst
stage of the game are strictly concave in compatibility investments, xi, along the
path of equal investments. This implies, that every subgame at the second stage
has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.22 According to Assumption 2 (ii) we
posit that Assumption 2 (i), and not Assumption 1, is the binding condition for
the spillover parameter ¯.
Let us now de¯ne by - the set of vectors of parameters, with ! = (A; v; ¯; °) 2
R4+, which satisfy Assumption 1 and 2; i.e., - = f! 2 R4+j¯ <
p
2° < 9v
2A
g.23
We now solve the game by backward induction, where we restrict attention to
symmetric equilibria.24 In Section 2.1 we calculate the noncooperative and co-
operative optimal strategies in the ¯rst stage of the game. In Section 2.2 we look
at the optimal strategies under all three regimes given the optimal strategies in
the second stage of the game. In Section 2.3 we calculate the welfare maximizing
outcome.
2.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium
Noncooperative behavior: In the second stage ¯rm i's pro¯t function, ¦i, condi-
tional on x1 and x2, is
¦i = (A+ ¯xj ¡ qi ¡ qj)qi + vxi ¡ °
2
x2i ; j 6= i; i = 1; 2: (2)
The symmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium can be computed to be25
qi =
A+ 2¯xj ¡ ¯xi
3
; j 6= i; i = 1; 2: (3)
22Analytically Assumption 2 (i) ensures that all second order conditions for NN , CN , CC,
and the welfare maximizing regime, which will be introduced below, are ful¯lled.
23With R+ we denote the set of all positive real numbers including zero.
24In Section 5, following Salant & Shaffer [1998], [1999] we also examine asymmetric
solutions under the CN regime.
25The second order condition for a pro¯t maximum is always ful¯lled.
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Substitution of qi into the pro¯t function (2) gives the reduced pro¯t function
¦Ni (the superscript N stands for noncooperative behavior in the second stage):
¦Ni =
1
9
(A+ 2¯xj ¡ ¯xi)2 + vxi ¡ °
2
x2i ; j 6= i; i = 1; 2: (4)
Collusive behavior: Now, consider the case where ¯rms use the committee to
collude on the mass market. Assuming a symmetric solution, such that q1 = q2 =
q and x1 = x2 = x holds, we get the joint-pro¯t function
¦ = 2(A+ ¯x¡ 2q)q + 2vx¡ °x2: (5)
Maximization yields for each ¯rm's quantities
q =
A+ ¯x
2
; (6)
and by substituting (6) into the joint-pro¯t function (5) we get the reduced joint-
pro¯t function, ¦C (the superscript C stands for cooperative behavior in the ¯rst
stage):
¦C = ¦C1 +¦
C
2 =
1
4
(A+ ¯x)2 + 2vx¡ °x2; (7)
for x1 = x2 = x under the symmetric solution q1 = q2 = q. We now turn to the
¯rst stage of the game in which ¯rms decide about their compatibility investment
levels.
2.2 First-Stage Equilibrium
Given ¯rms' strategies in the second stage, we examine now the subgame perfect
investment decision in the ¯rst stage under the three di®erent regimes.
Compatibility Competition (NN ): In this case ¯rms do not coordinate their com-
patibility decisions. Thus, each ¯rm simultaneously chooses its investment to ma-
ximize (4) with respect to xi. This gives a unique symmetric solution satisfying
(@ ¦Ni =@ xi) = 0, for which we get
26
xNNi =
9v ¡ 2¯A
9° + 2¯2
; i = 1; 2; (8)
26The second order condition requires ¯2 ¡ 9
2
° < 0 or ¯ < 3
p
°=2 ¼ 2:12p°. The stability
condition j @ xi@ xj j < 1 reduces to the same condition as the second order condition. In contrast
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and
qNNi =
3(°A+ ¯v)
9° + 2¯2
; i = 1; 2; (9)
where the superscript NN indicates the compatibility competition regime. Note
that Assumption 1 ensures that the right-hand side of Equation (8) is strictly
positive. We, therefore, exclude the case, that there might prevail perfect in-
terbrand incompatibility in the sense that no ¯rm undertakes any compatibility
investments.
Compatibility Committee (CN ): Here, as in the case of NN , ¯rms compete on
the mass market in the second stage. However, they coordinate their compati-
bility investments to maximize the sum of their combined pro¯ts. That is, they
form a standardization committee while maintaining competition in the product
market. We have to maximize the sum of each ¯rm's pro¯ts, so that we get for
x1 = x2 = x the committee's pro¯t function
¦CN = ¦CN1 +¦
CN
2 =
2
9
(A+ ¯x)2 + 2vx¡ °x2; (10)
where the superscript CN stands for the compatibility committee regime. The
symmetric cooperative equilibrium in compatibility investments and in produc-
tion corresponds to the following unique solution27
xCN =
9v + 2¯A
9° ¡ 2¯2 ; (11)
and
qCN =
3(°A+ ¯v)
9° ¡ 2¯2 : (12)
From Equation (11) we observe that cooperation on the investment stage is suf-
¯cient to induce positive investment levels, even if marginal net revenues on the
niche market are equal to zero; i.e., v = 0.
to the model of d'Aspremont & Jacquemin [1988], in our model, the stability condition
does not restrict the spillover parameter to a positive minimum level as has been detected by
Henriques [1990].
27The second order condition requires ¯ < 3
p
°=2 ¼ 2:12p°.
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Cartelization (CC): This third case deals with ¯rms maximizing joint pro¯ts in
both stages of the game. At the ¯rst stage, the reduced joint pro¯t function, ¦C,
is given by Equation (7), and we obtain the unique solution, satisfying28
xCC =
4v + ¯A
4° ¡ ¯2 ; (13)
and
qCC =
°A+ ¯v
4° ¡ ¯2 ; (14)
where CC represents the cartelization regime. Let us now turn to the welfare
maximizing investment and output levels before we will compare our results.
2.3 First-Best Welfare
To compare the above results we need to establish an e±cient standard. The-
refore, let us de¯ne ¯rst-best social welfare WFB(q; x) as the sum of the con-
sumer surplus CS(q; x) and the producer surplus (assuming x1 = x2 = x and
q1 = q2 = q). Given our speci¯cation of an linear inverse demand schedule,
29
consumer surplus is CS(q; x) = 2q2, and the social welfare function is given by
WFB(q; x) = 2(A+ ¯x¡ q)q + 2vx¡ °x2: (15)
We get as the e±cient output for each ¯rm30
q =
A+ ¯x
2
: (16)
Hence, at the ¯rst stage, the reduced social welfare function is
WFB =
1
2
(A+ ¯x)2 + 2vx¡ °x2: (17)
28The second order condition for the second stage requires ¯ < 2
p
°.
29Recall all ¯rms are assumed to extract all the entire consumer surplus in their niche markets.
30The second order condition does always hold.
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Table 1: Firms' Equilibrium Quantities, Investments, and Prices
Regime Quantity Investment Price
NN qNN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°+2¯2
xNN = 9v¡2¯A
9°+2¯2
pNN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°+2¯2
CN qCN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°¡2¯2 x
CN = 9v+2¯A
9°¡2¯2 p
CN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°¡2¯2
CC qCC = °A+¯v
4°¡¯2 x
CC = 4v+¯A
4°¡¯2 p
CC = 2(°A+¯v)
4°¡¯2
FB qFB = °A+¯v
2°¡¯2 x
FB = 2v+¯A
2°¡¯2 p
FB = 0
The e±cient level of compatibility investment for each ¯rm satisfying the ¯rst
order condition for a welfare maximum is31
xFB =
2v + ¯A
2° ¡ ¯2 ; (18)
and hence, the welfare maximizing solution on the mass market is
qFB =
°A+ ¯v
2° ¡ ¯2 ; (19)
where the superscript FB indicates the ¯rst-best outcome.
3 Comparison of Results
In Table 1 our results concerning quantities, compatibility investments, and prices
are summarized, where we suppressed the index i because of symmetry.
We can now formulate the following proposition with respect to ¯rms' investment
levels.
Proposition 1 For ! 2 - the equilibrium compatibility investment levels of each
¯rm, xl, under the di®erent regimes, l = FB;NN ; CN ; CC, satisfy the following
ordering:
xFB ¸ xCC ¸ xCN ¸ xNN :
31The second order condition is given by ¯ <
p
2° ¼ 1:41p°, which is the binding condition
for assuring a unique interior solution for all regimes under consideration.
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Furthermore,
xFB > xCC > xCN > xNN ;
if and only if ¯ > 0 holds (equality holding if and only if ¯ = 0).
Proof: Follows directly from comparing (8), (11), (13), and (18). For ¯ = 0 we
obtain xFB = xCC = xCN = xNN = v
°
. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 states that cooperative investment activity exceeds the competi-
tive investment level in the presence of positive spillovers. Investment levels come
closest to the ¯rst-best case when ¯rms collude in both stages of the game. Com-
parison of CN and NN reveals an important di®erence between the economic
literature on R&D spillovers and our analysis of positive spillovers form compati-
bility investments. One major ¯nding of that literature is that cooperative R&D
activities in the case of CN exceed competitive research levels if and only if the
extent to which information °ows freely among competitors is relatively high. In
our model this general ¯nding is independent of the exact parameter value of the
spillover parameter.32 Cooperative internalization of the positive externalities on
joint pro¯ts accruing from each ¯rms' compatibility investments increase invest-
ment levels, because they outweigh the disadvantage due to positive spillovers
bene¯ting the competitor on the mass market. Moreover, investment levels in-
crease proportionally with higher degrees of cooperation, so that investments are
closest to the ¯rst-best level under the cartelization regime (CC).
The following proposition characterizes the results for the quantities of produc-
tion.
Proposition 2 Consider all ! 2 -. Then for all ° > 0 there exists a critical
value ^¯, such that the equilibrium quantities of each ¯rm on the mass market, ql,
32In particular, d'Aspremont & Jacquemin [1988] report the classi¯cation xFB > xCC >
xCN > xN N for large values of ¯ 2 (1; 0:5), and the classi¯cation xFB > xN N > xCC > xCN for
small parameter values of ¯ 2 (¯; 0:41], where ¯ > 0 is determined by the stability condition
j@ xi=@ xj j < 1 for the NN case (see Henriques [1990]).
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under the di®erent regimes, l = FB;NN ; CN ; CC, satisfy
qFB > qCN ¸ qNN > qCC ; for 0 · ¯ < ^¯;
with qCN = qNN if and only if ¯ = 0, and
qFB > qCN > qCC ¸ qNN ; for ^¯ · ¯ <
p
2°;
with qCC = qNN if and only if ¯ = ^¯, where ^¯ ´
q
3
5
° ¼ 0:78p°.
Proof: See Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that the closest to the social optimum is what is produced
under the committee compatibility (CN ) regime. Moreover, for relatively large
spillovers, such that ¯ >
q
3
5
° is ful¯lled, fully cooperative behavior (CC) leads
to higher production quantities than pure competitive behavior (NN ). This
surprising ¯nding reveals an important di®erence between compatibility and R&D
spillovers. In contrast to R&D investments, which primarily reduce the unit costs
of the investing ¯rm, investments into interbrand compatibility never generate any
direct advantageous e®ects for the investing ¯rm on the mass market. As a result,
full internalization of compatibility investments under the cartelization regime
(CC) might lead to higher production levels on the mass market compared to NN
although monopoly pricing prevails. In this particular case, the market expansion
e®ect generated by compatibility investments outweighs the monopolization e®ect
due to collusive behavior on the mass market. This result is the more likely the
higher the value of the spillover parameter.
The following proposition states the welfare results of our model.
Proposition 3 Consider all ! 2 -. Then welfare, W l, under the di®erent regi-
mes, l = FB;NN ; CN ; CC, satis¯es the following ordering:
WFB > W CN > W CC; for ¯ ¸ 0;
and
WFB > W CN ¸WNN ; for ¯ ¸ 0;
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where W CN = WNN if and only if ¯ = 0. Furthermore, for all ° ¸ 0, there exists
a critical value ¯¤, such that
WNN > W CC ; if and only if 0 · ¯ < ¯¤;
and
WNN · W CC; if and only if ¯¤ · ¯ <
p
2°;
where ¯¤ ´ 1
92
p
17434¡ 782p73p° ¼ 1:13p°. Moreover, WNN = W CC if and
only if ¯ = ¯¤.
Proof: See Appendix. Q.E.D.
From Proposition 3 we see that welfare under CN is higher than under NN ,
whenever the spillover parameter is positive. The intuition for this result is the
following: From Proposition 2 we know that qCN > qNN holds for ¯ > 0, so that
consumer surplus must have increased. Firms' pro¯ts also must have increased,
because otherwise ¯rms would have chosen the noncooperative investment levels
under the fully cooperative regime. Therefore, consumer surplus and ¯rms' pro¯ts
both increase under the CN regime compared to the NN regime.
From Proposition 1 and 2 we obtain a su±cient condition for welfare under CC
being higher than under NN , namely ^¯ >
q
3
5
°, so that both quantities of
production and compatibility investment levels are higher under CC. However,
Proposition 3 shows that social welfare increases under CC even for lower values
of the spillover parameter, such that ¯ > ¯¤, with ^¯ > ¯¤, has to hold. For
relatively small spillovers, such that 0 · ¯ < ¯¤ holds, the fully noncooperative
solution (NN ) gives higher levels of output, which outweigh the social bene¯ts
from relatively higher investments under CC.
In contrast to R&D investments which reduce the investing ¯rm's unit costs to
a larger extent than the other ¯rm's unit costs, spillovers from compatibility
investments do only bene¯t the rival ¯rm on the mass market. Therefore, by
comparing our results with the literature on cost-reducing R&D spillovers, we
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can conclude that spillovers stemming from interbrand compatibility investments
give even stronger e±ciency reasons for horizontal cooperation.33 This might help
to explain why cooperative inter¯rm relations within standardization committees
or airline alliances with codesharing arrangements, are usually not alleged to be
anticompetitive.
Before turning to some extensions of our above analysis, we want to ¯nish the
comparison of our results with the following proposition classifying the prices
prevailing under each regime.
Proposition 4 For ! 2 - the equilibrium prices on the mass market, pl, under
the di®erent regimes, l = FB;NN ; CN ; CC, satisfy the following ordering:
pFB < pNN · pCN < pCC;
with pCN = pNN if and only if ¯ = 0.
Proof: Follows directly from comparison of equilibrium prices, which are presented
in Table 1. Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 4 prices increase monotonically with the degree of co-
operation. Since compatibility investments increase consumers' willingness to
pay for the rival's mass market product, high prices do not necessarily re°ect
lower consumer surplus. Indeed, as in the CN case, higher prices are the result
of socially bene¯cial compatibility investments, so that prices above the fully
competitive level re°ect higher quality of the mass market product.
Finally let us compare our results with the existing literature on parallely ver-
tically integrated ¯rms, which choose prices of the complementary products and
33In our welfare analysis we rather underestimated the welfare e®ects generated by compatibi-
lity investments. Assume linear niche market demand and monopolistic pricing, then consumer
surplus is a convex function of the supplier's compatibility investments, implying that coopera-
tion might be even more bene¯cial for society than it is in our model. Given the speci¯cation
of the demand schedule as stated in Footnote 19, the niche market consumer surplus is in this
alternative example equal to 18h (M + x ¡ hk)2.
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product variety when products are either perfectly compatible or perfectly in-
compatible.34 A common result in those models is that pro¯ts are higher in a
regime of full compatibility. Compatibility increases demand, and hence, prices,
so that pro¯ts increase. In contrast to this result, our analysis has shown that
¯rms prefer to choose relatively low compatibility levels in a purely noncoopera-
tive environment, because compatibility is costly to achieve and leads to spillover
e®ects which in turn increase the rival's mass product quality.
Before concluding the paper we now examine two extensions of our analysis which
deserve more attention. First, following Kamien, Muller & Zang [1992] we
investigate ¯rms' incentives to establish RJV-like institutions which lead to higher
levels of the spillover parameter or, similarly, the government's incentives to force
¯rms to exchange private information concerning the technical design of interfa-
ces, so that the value of the spillover parameter increases. Second, in accordance
with Salant & Shaffer [1998], [1999] we show that optimal strategies of ¯rms
cooperating in investments, while competing on the product market, might lead
to asymmetric outcomes.
4 Open Standardization Policy
In accordance with the approach proposed by Kamien, Muller & Zang [1992]
we examine the impact of RJV-like institutions which increase the level of the
spillover parameter.35 In contrast to all regimes mentioned above ¯rms pool
all their compatibility e®orts in an RJV such that all information concerning
the technological interface is revealed to each ¯rm, and hence, compatibility in-
34See for example, Matutes & Regibeau [1988], and Economides [1989], [1991a].
35More precisely, Kamien, Muller & Zang [1992] propose that the formation of an RJV
increases the spillover parameter to its maximum level, which is one. Our model di®ers from
theirs, since they look at informational R&D spillovers. In our model where ¯ measures the
degree to which the other ¯rm's mass market demand increases from compatibility investments,
such a rationale for interpreting ¯ does not exist.
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vestments become more e®ective. In the context of standardization committees
we may interpret a regime which increases the spillover parameter as an \open
standard" committee, which demands that participants reveal all features of the
interface technology. Similarly, the government might pursue an open standardi-
zation policy by forcing ¯rms to disclose information concerning the compatibility
technology.36 The following two lemmas summarize the comparative static results
with respect to ¯ for ¯rms' pro¯ts and welfare under the di®erent regimes.
Lemma 1 For ! 2 -, di®erentiation of the reduced pro¯t functions, ¦l, under
the di®erent regimes l = NN ; CN ;CC, with respect to ¯ gives
@ ¦k
@ ¯
> 0; with k = CN ;CC:
Under the NN regime we obtain the following ordering:
(i) Given 0 · ¯ <
q
3
2
°, there exists a critical value v0 = maxf2
p
2°A
9
; 2¯A(27°¡2¯
2)
27(3°¡2¯2) g,
such that
@ ¦NN
@ ¯
¸ 0; if and only if v ¸ v0;
and
@¦NN
@ ¯
< 0; if and only if v < v0:
(ii) Given
q
3
2
° · ¯ < p2°, we get
@ ¦NN
@ ¯
< 0:
Proof: See Appendix. Q.E.D.
36One example of an open standardization policy is provided by the recently implemented EC
Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs which introduces a limited right of
\decompilation" whereby otherwise infringing acts that occur during the course of decompiling
a program (i.e., copying ¯les, translating object code back into source code) are permitted
where they are necessary to gain information to allow software/hardware interoperability (see
also Schmidtchen & Koboldt [1993] and Shurmer & Lea [1995]).
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From Lemma 1 we observe that ¯rms unambiguously prefer to reveal all relevant
informations concerning the interface technology to their rivals, whenever coope-
ration on the compatibility investment stage is possible. For the NN regime
¯rms may want to hide information to make the rival's compatibility investments
less e®ective, whenever the spillover parameter is su±ciently large. Disclosure
of interface informations is individually optimal for relatively low levels of the
spillover parameter and su±ciently large direct bene¯ts from compatibility in-
vestments, v. The intuition for this result can be derived from recognizing that
due to free-rider behavior compatibility investments decrease for increasing values
of the spillover parameter; i.e., @ x
NN
@ ¯
< 0. However, equilibrium mass product
production, qNN = A+¯x
NN
3
, increases if the following condition holds:
d qNN
d ¯
=
1
3
µ
xNN + ¯
@ xNN
@ ¯
¶
> 0
) xNN > ¯
¯¯¯¯
@ xNN
@ ¯
¯¯¯¯
: (20)
Each ¯rm's production quantity on the mass market increases with higher values
of the spillover parameter, if the contraction in compatibility investments times
the spillover parameter is according to Condition 20 not too large. This is the
more likely, the lower the initial value of the spillover parameter and the higher
the marginal pro¯ts on the niche market, v.37 Therefore, if the quantity expansion
e®ect induced by higher levels of the spillover parameter is large enough, ¯rms'
pro¯ts will increase in theNN regime when ¯rms agree to reveal relevant interface
information.
The following lemma states the corresponding welfare results for each regime.
Lemma 2 For ! 2 -, di®erentiation of the reduced welfare function, W l, under
the di®erent regimes l = FB;NN ; CN ; CC, with respect to ¯ gives
@ W k
@ ¯
> 0; with k = FB; CN ; CC:
37The latter follows from the fact that magnitude of the derivative @ x
NN
@ ¯
decreases with
higher values of v.
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Under the NN regime, there exists a critical value v00 = maxf2
p
2°A
9
; ¯A(45°¡2¯
2)
9(9°¡4¯2) g
such that
@ WNN
@ ¯
¸ 0; if and only if v ¸ v00;
and
@ WNN
@ ¯
< 0; if and only if v < v00:
Proof: See Appendix. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1 and 2 we can derive Proposition 5 and 6 which summarize the
welfare results of an open standardization policy as a result of a private agreement
and state intervention.
Proposition 5 For all ! 2 -, any privately enforced increase of the spillover
parameter ¯ increases social welfare under all regimes l = NN ; CN ; CC.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and recognizing that
v00 < v0 for 0 · ¯ <
q
3
2
°. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 gives clear cut conclusions with respect to private agreements which
force ¯rms to disclose relevant informations concerning the interface technology.
In all regime those agreements lead to higher welfare levels.
The following proposition states the welfare e®ects of an open standardization
policy pursued by the government via reducing the protection of intellectual pro-
perty rights.
Proposition 6 Consider all ! 2 -. An increase of the spillover parameter ¯
enforced by the government increases welfare unambiguously in the CN and the CC
regime. Under the NN regime , for relatively low levels of the spillover parameter,
such that 0 · ¯ <
q
2
3
° holds, an increase of the spillover parameter generated by
state intervention increases welfare if and only if v > v0 holds; otherwise, higher
levels of the spillover parameter induce lower welfare levels.
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Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and recognizing for the
NN case that v00 < v0 holds for 0 · ¯ <
q
3
2
°. Q.E.D.
From Proposition 6 we can conclude that an open standardization policy by the
government does always unfold socially bene¯cial e®ects when ¯rms are allowed
to cooperate. The same conclusion may hold for the NN case, whenever the le-
vel of spillovers is relatively low. However, an open standardization policy might
reduce welfare when ¯rms operate in a perfectly noncooperative environment and
the spillover parameter is relatively large or marginal pro¯ts on the niche market
are too low, whenever the spillover parameter is relatively low. Under such con-
ditions an increase of the spillover parameter lead ¯rms to reduce compatibility
investments and mass market production quantities, so that welfare decreases.
Therefore, if cooperation among ¯rms is allowed our analysis con¯rms the sup-
position that relatively weak protection of intellectual property rights concerning
the compatibility design is socially bene¯cial (see Farrell [1989], [1995]).
It should be pointed out that an open standardization policy does not always lead
to higher degrees of interbrand compatibility, as measured by the sum of ¯rms'
compatibility investments. For the NN regime higher values of the spillover
parameter transform into lower investment levels. This result stands in contrast
to the presumption that weaker protection of intellectual property rights directly
transforms into higher degrees of compatibility (see Farrell & Katz [1998,
44]). Whenever it is costly to a achieve compatibility ex ante, as we assume
in our analysis, purely noncooperative behavior induces ¯rms to reduce their
compatibility e®orts for increasing values of the spillover parameter.
5 Standardization as an Asymmetric Solution
Until now, we restricted our analysis to symmetric equilibria in which both ¯rms
have the same investment and production levels, and two di®erent interface desi-
gns prevailing on the mass market. In this section we drive a su±cient condition,
26
in which the joint-pro¯t maximizing solution is asymmetric in the CN regime.
The symmetric solution to the hybrid speci¯cation of the two-stage game, in
which ¯rms choose investment levels cooperatively in the ¯rst stage and determine
production quantities noncooperatively in the second stage, has been adopted by
almost all the literature that was sparked by the seminal work of d'Aspremont
& Jacquemin [1988].38 The symmetric solution has been recently criticized by
Salant & Shaffer [1998], [1999].39 They show that joint pro¯t maximization
of identical ¯rms on the investment stage may lead to asymmetric outcomes, in
which one ¯rm has a larger market share than its rivals. Salant and Sha®er's
analysis is based on the general property of any symmetric Cournot equilibrium,
namely, that for a given amount of total output aggregate production costs are
maximized when identical ¯rms have equal market shares.40 Therefore, joint pro-
¯ts can be increased by reallocating investments between ¯rms, such that ¯rms
with lower marginal production costs produce more compared to those ¯rms
which have higher marginal costs.
Building on this e±ciency rationale for market dominance, Salant and Sha®er
derive a su±cient condition for an asymmetric outcome to dominate a symmetric
outcome, which we now apply to our analysis.41 According to Salant and Sha®er
we have to calculate the reduced joint pro¯ts as a function of each ¯rm's individual
38The impact of d'Aspremont & Jacquemin [1988] can easily be appreciated given the
numerous follow-up studies, as cited in Footnote 8, it gave rise to. All those studies con¯ned
their analysis to symmetric cooperative R&D investments.
39The only papers beside Salant & Shaffer [1998], [1999] we are aware of deviating
from this approach are Amir & Wooders [1998a], [1998b], which investigate one-sided R&D
spillovers.
40Salant & Shaffer [1998], [1999] analysis builds on Bergstrom & Varian [1985a],
[1985b]. In the ¯rst paper Bergstrom and Varian shown that for constant marginal costs,
aggregate industry output depends in any interior Cournot equilibrium only on the sum of
marginal costs and not on the distribution of these costs. In the latter paper the authors
proved that an increase of the variance of marginal costs reduces aggregate production costs,
so that aggregate production costs are maximized when ¯rms have the same marginal costs.
41This condition is given by Proposition 2 in Salant & Shaffer [1999] and has been applied
to the d'Aspremont-Jacquemin model in Salant & Shaffer [1998].
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investment levels under the compatibility committee regime (CN ), which are
given by
¦CN =
2X
i=1
·
1
9
(A+ 2¯xj ¡ ¯xi)2 + vxi ¡ °
2
x2i
¸
; j 6= i: (21)
Now, let k be any positive constant and substitute x2 = k ¡ x1 into Equation
(21), what gives
¦CN =
1
9
£
(A+ 2¯k ¡ 3¯x1)2 + (A+ 3¯x1 ¡ ¯k)2
¤
+ vk ¡ °
2
£
x21 + (k ¡ x1)2
¤
:
To derive a su±cient condition for the existence of an asymmetric outcome yiel-
ding higher joint pro¯ts than the symmetric outcome, this reduced pro¯t function
has to by convex in x1. Taking the total derivative twice, one obtains
@2¦CN
@ x21
= 4¯2 ¡ 2° > 0: (22)
The su±cient condition (22) can be rewritten as ¯ >
q
1
2
°, which shows that this
condition is the more likely to be ful¯lled the higher the spillover parameter, ¯,
or the lower the compatibility cost parameter, °, is. Intuitively, a larger spillover
parameter increases the quality gap created by any given reallocation of a ¯xed
aggregate investment, so that the gain from a reduction in joint production costs
increases in the second stage. Accordingly, the smaller the slope of the marginal
cost of compatibility investment, the smaller will be the increase in aggregate
compatibility costs of making investments unequal.42
The following example illustrates that joint pro¯t maximization might lead to
a corner solution, in which only one ¯rm serves the mass market, and the other
¯rm specializes in producing its niche market product.43 This means, cooperation
42Comparison of the corresponding su±cient condition for the d'Aspremont-Jacquemin mo-
del, as it has been derived by Salant & Shaffer [1998], reveals an important di®erence
between their and our model. In the d'Aspremont-Jacquemin model an increase in ¯ tends to
reduce di®erences in marginal costs among ¯rms, while in our model such an increase leads to
an increase in the di®erence of consumer's maximum willingness to pay for each ¯rm's products.
43We posit that ¯rm i's marginal pro¯ts on its niche market are zero (v = 0), if and only
if the rival's mass market production quantity is zero; i.e., qj = 0. Otherwise, ¯rm i would
always invest into interbrand compatibility even if the other ¯rm does not supply a mass market
product.
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among ¯rms on the compatibility investment stage can induce complete standar-
dization, so that only one interface design prevails among the interrelated mass
market and niche markets. Under these circumstances one ¯rm monopolizes the
mass market and provides the industry compatibility standard to which all ¯rms
specializing on their niche markets adhere.
Example (Standardization):44 Let A = 40, v = 10, ° = 1, and ¯ = 1.
Then compatibility investments (mass market production levels) for the symme-
tric solution are xCN = 24:286 (qCN = 21:43) and for the asymmetric solution
xA2 = 60 (q
A
1 = 50). Joint pro¯ts for the symmetric solution are ¦
CN = 920:08
and for the asymmetric solution ¦A = 1; 300. Welfare for the symmetric solution
is W CN = 1; 732 and for the asymmetric solution WA = 2; 550.
This example shows that the symmetric solution in the CN regime might be
privately and socially dominated by an asymmetric solution in which only one
¯rm serves the mass market and the other ¯rm specializes in the production of
its niche market product. As the example indicates, interbrand compatibility is
much higher in such an asymmetric outcome than in the symmetric outcome.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed ¯rms' incentives to undertake interbrand compa-
tibility investments ex post; i.e., after mass market standard technologies have
been established. It has been argued that achieving interbrand compatibility ex
post is not an either-or decision problem as in the case of ex ante coordination
on a particular industry standard.
Firms have to undertake investments which are governed by a quadratic costs
function. We have analyzed the impact of three organizational modes, varying
44In the Appendix, we derive the joint pro¯t function and the welfare function, whenever
¯rm 1 monopolizes the mass market and ¯rm 2 specializes in its niche market product, for the
CN regime.
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from pure market contact to full cartelization, on ¯rms' incentives to invest into
interbrand compatibility which increases the quality of the rival's mass market
product via demand side spillovers.
We have compared our results with the ¯rst-best regime and have shown that
the hybrid regime CN , with ¯rms cooperating with respect to compatibility in-
vestments and competing on the mass market, gives second-best welfare for all
feasible values of the spillover parameter. Therefore, our model gives strong ef-
¯ciency reasons for horizontal cooperation among ¯rms as we may observe it
in standardization committees or international alliances which incorporate code-
sharing arrangements. However, antitrust authorities should watch those hybrid
organizations, since they might be used as a collusive device. While full carte-
lization leads to second-best compatibility levels it induces monopolistic pricing
on the mass market, so that welfare is always lower in the CC case compared to
the hybrid regime CN .
We also found that depending on the spillover parameter either the compatibility
competition (NN ) or the cartelization (CC) regime is the least desirable one.
For relatively low spillover e®ects the NN regime generates higher welfare levels
than the CC regime. However, for relatively high levels of the spillover parameter
cartelization (CC) increases investment activity so much that welfare is higher
under CC compared to NN . This result demonstrates that social payo®s from
cooperation towards interbrand compatibility are signi¯cantly higher than those
which are generated by cooperation in the presence of R&D spillovers. The lite-
rature on R&D investments with spillovers has shown that full cartelization (CC)
does never lead to higher welfare levels compared to pure competitive behavior
(NN ).
The policy implications are therefore straight forward. In markets that meet our
suppositions, cooperation of compatibility investments in standardization com-
mittees should be encouraged, while competition on the mass market has to be
preserved. In markets with relatively large spillover e®ects the worst thing the
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government could do is to prevent any kind of cooperation among ¯rms. In this
case a fully cooperative outcome would be preferable to a fully noncooperative
outcome from a social planer point of view.
Moreover, we have analyzed the e®ects of an open standardization policy, either
enforced by the state or by private agreement among ¯rms. An open standardiza-
tion policy has been interpreted as a legal or private provision compelling ¯rms to
reveal relevant intellectual property to ¯rms producing complementary products.
Such a policy, which increases the spillover e®ects from interbrand compatibility
investments, has been proved to be socially bene¯cial, whenever ¯rms are allowed
to cooperate. Results concerning the NN , however, remain ambiguous. In par-
ticular, for large levels of spillover parameter any further increase of it leads both
to lower investment and production levels. In this case, increasing the spillover
parameter induces lower welfare levels.
While many people appear to believe intuitively that compatibility is more con-
ducive to competition and thus public policy should promote or mandate compa-
tibility through an open standardization policy, our model suggests a somewhat
di®erent view: An open standardization policy enforced through relatively weak
protection of intellectual property rights is unambiguously bene¯cial for society
if ¯rms are allowed to coordinate their investment decisions in cooperative stan-
dardization groups. However, when ¯rms are operating in a purely competitive
environment, weak protection of intellectual property rights might strengthen the
adverse e®ects of free-rider behavior, leading to even lower compatibility e®orts.
As the main result of our paper, therefore, we can conclude that the optimal policy
mix in the realm of our model is to allow inter-¯rm cooperation in standardiza-
tion committees, while preserving product market competition, and to abandon
protection of intellectual property rights concerning the relevant features of the
interface technology.
Finally, it has been shown that cooperation at the investment stage might lead to
asymmetric outcomes, with only one mass market product, and hence, one com-
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patibility standard prevailing. In this case, the other ¯rm specializes in producing
its niche market product.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Cases NN and CN : From (9) and (12) we get qNN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°+2¯2
· 3(°A+¯v)
9°¡2¯2 =
qCN , or ¡¯2 · ¯2, with equality holding if ¯ = 0.
Cases NN and CC: From (9) and (14) we obtain qNN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°+2¯2
> °A+¯v
4°¡¯2 = q
CC,
what reduces to ¯ <
q
3
5
°. This gives, for all ! 2 -, the ordering stated in the
proposition.
Cases CN and CC: Comparing (12) with (14) we get qCN = 3(°A+¯v)
9°¡2¯2 >
°A+¯v
4°¡¯2 =
qCC , for all ! 2 -.
Of course, ¯rst-best production quantity, qFB, is the largest because of marginal
cost pricing, with pFB = 0, and because of ¯rst-best compatibility investments,
xFB, being higher compared to all other regimes. This proves Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Cases CN and NN : Substituting qCN and xCN , and qNN and xNN respectively,
into the welfare formula (15) and comparing W CN and WNN we get
288¯2(9° ¡ ¯2)(°A+ ¯v)2
(¡9° + 2¯2)2(9° + 2¯2)2 ¸ 0:
All three terms in brackets are strictly positive, so that W CN ¸ WNN holds for
all ! 2 - and equality holding for ¯ = 0.
Cases CC and NN : Substituting qCC and xCC, and qNN and xNN respectively,
into the welfare formula (15) and comparing W CC and WNN we get
(¡333°2 + 379°¯2 ¡ 92¯4)(°A+ ¯v)2
(¡4° + ¯2)2(9° + 2¯2)2
>
=
<
0:
Both terms in the denominator and the second term in the numerator are strictly
positive for all ! 2 -. Calculating the roots of the ¯rst term in the numerator
gives four real solutions, with one feasible solution, namely,
¯¤ =
1
92
q
17434¡ 782p73p° ¼ 1:13p°:
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It is now straight forward to check that WNN and W CC have to be ordered as
stated in the proposition.
Cases CN and CC: Again, we calculate W CN = W CC and obtain
(333°2 ¡ 163¯2° + 20¯4)(°A+ ¯v)2
(¡9° + 2¯2)2(¡4° + ¯2)2 > 0:
Both terms in the denominator and the second term in the numerator are strictly
positive for all ! 2 -. Calculating the roots of the ¯rst term in the numerator
gives two pairs of conjugate complex roots, with no solution along the real axis.
It is now easily checked that W CN > W CC holds for all ! 2 -. This establishes
Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 1
The ¯rst part of the lemma follows directly from di®erentiation of the reduced
pro¯t functions ¦CN and ¦CC with respect to ¯. The second part of the lemma,
which refers to the NN regime, follows from substituting (9) and (8) into (2)
and di®erentiating with respect to ¯. This gives
@ ¦NN
@ ¯
= 2
[27v(3° ¡ 2¯2) + 2¯A(2¯2 ¡ 27°)](°A+ ¯v)
(9° + 2¯2)3
;
so that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term
27v(3° ¡ 2¯2) + 2¯A(2¯2 ¡ 27°):
The second term in brackets is strictly negative for all ! 2 -, and the ¯rst term
in brackets is non-positive for ¯ ¸
q
3
2
. Hence, the derivative is strictly negative
for
q
3
2
· ¯ < p2°. For 0 · ¯ <
q
3
2
we get the following condition, so that the
derivative is positive:
v >
2¯A(27° ¡ 2¯2)
27(3° ¡ 2¯2) ´ v:
If v · v0 the derivative is non-positive. This establishes Lemma 1. Note, that v
meets Assumption 1, what follows from v =
¡
2¯A
9
¢ ³
27°¡2¯2
9°¡6¯2
´
, where the second
fraction in brackets is strictly greater than one. However, v may not comply with
Assumption 2, in which case the derivate would always be positive.
Proof of Lemma 2
The ¯rst part of the proposition follows directly from inserting the equilibrium
values of ¯rms' investment and production levels into the welfare formula (15)
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and di®erentiating with respect to ¯. Similarly, we obtain for the NN case
@ WNN
@ ¯
= 8
[9v(9° ¡ 4¯2) + ¯A(2¯2 ¡ 45°)](°A+ ¯v)
(9° + 2¯2)3
;
so that the sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the term
9v(9° ¡ 4¯2) + ¯A(2¯2 ¡ 45°):
For all ! 2 -, both terms in brackets have strictly opposite signs, and we get the
following condition for the derivative being positive:
v >
¯A(45° ¡ 2¯2)
9(9° ¡ 4¯2) ´ v:
Rewriting v according to v =
¡
2¯A
9
¢ ³
45°¡2¯2
18°¡8¯2
´
, we see that v ful¯ls Assumption
1, because the second term in brackets being strictly greater than one. However,
v is not within the restricted domain of parameters, -, if v =
¡
2¯A
9
¢ ³
45°¡2¯2
18°¡8¯2
´
>
2
p
2°A
9
holds. In this particular case any increase of ¯ would increase welfare under
the NN regime. This proves Lemma 2.
Joint Pro¯ts and Welfare in the Asymmetric Solution of Example 1
In this example, we focus on a particular asymmetric solution in which q1 > 0,
q2 = 0, x1 = 0, and x2 > 0 holds. Whenever ¯rm 1 is the only supplier on
the mass market it produces the monopoly quantity qA1 =
1
2
(A + ¯x2). This
gives the reduced joint pro¯t function in the ¯rst stage: ¦(x2) = (A + ¯x2 ¡
qA)qA+vx2¡ °2x22, which is maximized at xA2 = ¯A+2v2°¡¯2 , where the superscript \A"
indicates the proposed asymmetric solution in the CN case. For q2 = 0 being a
subgame perfect strategy given that x1 = 0 and x
A
2 has been choosen in the ¯rst
stage, q2 =
A¡¯xA2
3
· 0, or ¯ · 1
2A
(
p
v2 + 4°A2 ¡ v) has to hold. Hence, taking
the parameter values of the example, we have to restrict attention to ¯ > 0:88.
Finally, social welfare is given by WA = (A + ¯xA2 ¡ q
A
1
2
)qA1 + vx
A
2 ¡ °2 (xA2 )2 for
the proposed asymmetric solution.
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